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ABSTRACT 
 
"Design for Safety" refers to a design paradigm introducing safety in design as another objective. This requires 
explicit consideration and quantification of safety, which is equivalent to evaluating risk during the design pro-
FHVVKHQFHWKHWHUP³5LVN-%DVHG'HVLJQ´ The essential advance attributable to Risk-Based Design is the holistic, 
explicit, rational and cost-effective treatment of safety, without which optimal design solutions are not feasible. 
This is achieved on the basis of principles that support multi-discipline design optimisation and promote the use of 
knowledge in all forms.  More specifically: 
 A formalised procedure to measure safety consistently (risk analysis / risk assessment / risk management).   
 Flexibility to allow trade-offs between Performance, Earnings, Risk and Costs; hence focus on life-cycle issues.  
 Integration of such procedure in the design process (integrated design environment) with focus on holistic opti-
misation. 
 
7KH³'HVLJQIRU6DIHW\´SKLORVRSK\DQGWKHHQVXLQJIRUPDOLVHGPHWKRGRORJ\³5LVN-%DVHG'HVLJQ5%'´ZHUH
introduced in commercial shipping as a design paradigm in the 1990s to help bestow safety as a design objective 
and a life-cycle imperative. This was meant to ensure that rendering safety a measurable (performance-based) de-
sign objective, through using first-principles tools, would incentivise industry to seek cost-effective safety solu-
tions, in response to rising societal expectations. It turned out that removing rules-imposed (largely-conservative) 
constraints and the adoption of a performance-based approach has had much more profound effects than originally 
anticipated, the full impact of which is yet to be delivered. This is particularly true for knowledge-intensive and 
safety-critical ships, such as naval vessels and the giants of the cruise ship industry being built today, where the 
need for technological innovation creates unprecedented safety challenges that cannot be sustained by prescrip-
tive-regulation-based safety.    
 
Drawing from the implementation of Risk-Based Design in the cruise ship industry, this paper presents and 
discusses the process of implementation and impact, demonstrating that all pre-requisite scientific and 
technological developments are in place for Risk-Based Design to be fully implemented in the naval sector as the 
platform to deliver active, adaptive and affordable vessels.   
 
Keywords: Design for Safety; Risk-Based Design (RBD); Safety Measurement and Verification; Life-Cycle Risk 
management 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Safety permeates all physical and temporal boundaries and as such it is the most influential factor in ship design and 
operation. Conversely, all human activity in a "risky" environment, such as the sea and in a fiercely competitive, 
tight-margins industry, such as the marine industry within a fast-changing, technology-intense world, is fraught with 
wide-ranging problems that tend to undermine safety. This calls for a "safety system" that is generic and flexible for 
ease of adaptation to change, holistic for ease of transcending complexity and sustainable for ease of gaining wider 
acceptance and support, thus providing a foundation for continuous improvement.  Such requirements demonstrate 
the deficiencies of the current safety system (prescriptive) and the challenges that lie ahead. This is particularly true 
for knowledge-intensive and safety-critical ships, such as naval vessels and the giants of the cruise ship industry 
being built today, where the need for innovation creates unprecedented safety challenges that cannot be sustained by 
prescriptive-regulation-based safety. The reason for this is simple: traditional approaches to safety (rules-based) are 
experiential and with change happening faster than experience is gained, the "safety system" is unsustainable.  This 
realisation helps explain the need for changing the way safety is treated in the maritime and naval sectors.  The need 
to change the way safety is being dealt with is forcing the realisation WKDWWKHPDULWLPHLQGXVWU\LVD³ULVNLQGXVWU\´
thus necessitating the adoption of risk-based approaches to maritime safety.  This, in turn, is paving the way to dras-
tic evolutionary changes in ship design and operation, more specifically to the development and implementation of 
Risk-Based Design (RBD) as the formal design methodology treating safety as a design objective rather than a con-
straint. The biggest impact has been at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and by IMO:  Safety Level, 
Alternative Design and Arrangements, Goal-Based Standards, Safe Return to Post, to name but a few unprecedented 
legislative instruments. The adoption of these marks the beginning of contemporary safety, catalysing an impact that 
is still being delivered.   
 
Albeit maturity of the underlying concepts, tools and techniques still remains a quest, there is tangible evidence of 
existing capability for implementation to the knowledge intensive cruise ship design as well as of the benefits being 
derived, particularly in facilitating multi-objective design optimisation with safety as one of these objectives.  It is 
with this in mind and considering the recent climate of declining defence budgets and increasing ship costs, leading 
to rapidly decreasing number of ships in most western navies, that this paper advocates the use of a truly holistic 
approach for a safety-critical platform as the only vehicle to counter potential decrease in capability through innova-
tion in the ship design process, namely the use of Risk-Based Design methodology.  
 
DESIGN FOR SAFETY: RISK-BASED DESIGN 
 
By defining safety as the state of acceptable risk (Vassalos, 1999), the duality "safety and risk" becomes easier to 
apprehend and this facilitates understanding of all the ensuing concepts. In this respect, "Design for Safety" refers to 
a design paradigm introducing safety in design as another objective. This requires explicit consideration and quanti-
fication of safety, which is equivalent to evaluating risk during the design process; hence the term Risk-Based De-
sign. Discussions at IMO over Goal-%DVHG6WDQGDUGVKDYHJLYHQULVHWRDQRWKHUWHUP³6DIHW\/HYHO´DZURQJFKRLFH
of terminology but it was meant to designate the through-life level of acceptable risk associated with a particular ship 
concept and, as such, becoming the new guiding philosophy to attaining safety cost-effectively. What this entails, 
however, is no mean task; it is nothing less than being able to quantify the life-cycle risk of a vessel by considering 
DOO³SDVVLYH´GHVLJQDQG³DFWLYH´RSHUDWLRQDOVDIHW\PHDVXUHVDQGWRGRVRGXULQJWKHFRQFHSWGHVLJQVWDJHXQGHU
extremely tight cost and time constraints. Application of RBD is biased towards design concepts with high levels of 
innovation, hence design risk. The essential advance attributable to RBD is the holistic, explicit, rational and cost-
effective treatment of safety.  To achieve this, the following principles have been put forward (Vassalos, 2008): 
 
1. A consistent measure of safety must be employed (risk) and a formalised procedure of its quantification adopted 
(risk analysis). For this to be workable, considering the complexity of what constitutes safety, a top-down ap-
proach is required with clear focus on major accident categories and Key Safety Performance Indicators (e.g., A-
Index for damage stability and similar indices for fire, systems availability, evacuability, etc.)), all such perfor-
mances captured with knowledge intensive models to enable fast and accurate safety performance evaluation and 
to facilitate optimisation studies.  
2. Formal procedures for risk quantification, risk assessment and risk management, used in the marine industry in-
clude the Formal Safety Assessment (IMO FSA 2002) for generic risk assessment (at ship fleet level) and in sup-
port of the rule making process and the Safety Case of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE Safety Case 2005) 
for use in specific design/measures, among others. The right-hand-side of Fig 1 illustrates the elements of a typi-
FDO³VDIHW\DVVHVVPHQWSURFHVV´ 
3. Such procedure must be integrated in the design process to allow for trade-offs between safety and other design 
factors by utilising overlaps between performance, life-cycle cost considerations, functional requirements and 
safety. The interfaces between the ship design process and the safety assessment procedure are illustrated in Fig 1. 
Consequently, additional information on safety performance and risk will be available for design decision-making 
and design optimisation.  
4. Considering the level of computations that might be necessary to address all pertinent safety concerns and the 
effect of safety-related design changes on the overall design performance, a different handling of the design pro-
cess is required. Namely, to allow for trade-offs between safety and other design objectives through overlaps at 
parameter level, the latter will also need to be addressed through the use of parametric models and access to fast, 
accurate and knowledge-intensive tools as well as access to databases (past designs, incident /accident data, etc.). 
Furthermore, the need for integration of all the tools and data under one umbrella (Integrated Design Environ-
ment) to facilitate data and process management is paramount. Risk-based Design is by its very nature akin to ho-
listic optimisation and use of formal optimisation and data analysis techniques essential to achieving optimum de-
sign solutions whilst ensuring cost-effective safety.  
 
The aforementioned RBD principles are reflected in the following high-level definition: RBD is a formalized meth-
odology that integrates systematically risk assessment in the design process with prevention/reduction of risk embed-
GHGDVDGHVLJQREMHFWLYHDORQJVLGH³FRQYHQWLRQDO´GHVLJQREMHFWLYHV. Put differently, safety rules give way to safety 
objectives, giving rise to additional functional requirements and design criteria and to the need for first-principles 
tools for YHULILFDWLRQRI³VDIHW\SHUIRUPDQFH´, in the absence of experiential knowledge.  Key to understanding 
RBD is the integration of risk assessment in the design process and decision-making towards achieving the overall 
design goals but also as part of a parallel (concurrent) iteration within the safety assessment procedure to meet safe-
ty-related goals/objectives as depicted by the high-level framework of Fig 1.  In relation to design decision-making, 
LQWKHVDPHZD\RIXVLQJH[SOLFLWVKLSSHUIRUPDQFHHYDOXDWLRQFULWHULDGHVLJQFULWHULDDQGHFRQRPLF³WDUJHWV´RZQ
HU¶VUHTXLUHPHQWVWKHUHLVDQHHGWRGHILQHsafety performance evaluation criteria and risk acceptance criteria. The 
latter could be related to safety performance criteria, so that safety performance could be used in the design itera-
tions, alongside or even instead of explicit risk acceptance criteria. As a result, key design aspects of the initial base-
line designs (watertight subdivision, structural design, internal layout, main vertical zones, bridge layout, materials, 
major ship systems, including safety systems, etc.) can be optimised from the point of view of ship performance, cost 
implications, potential earnings whilst ensuring that the safety level (as quantified) is appropriate and commensurate 
with acceptable and quantified risk levels (provided that such do exist).   
 
Another key aspect to Risk-Based Design is that any ship design decision will be well-informed and will lead to 
design concepts that are technically sound (at least to a level commensurate with state-of-the-art), fit for purpose, and 
last but not least, with a known level of safety that is more likely (than by following rules) to meet contemporary 
safety expectations.   
 
 
Fig 1  A High Level Framework for Risk-Based Design 
 
LIFE-CYCLE SAFETY (RISK) MANAGEMENT (LCRM) 
   
Concept and needs 
 
Every time there is an accident in the marine industry exposing gaps in design and operation, societal outcry follows, 
leading to new rules that target design improvements to address damage limitation post-accident.  Any such im-
provements focus mainly on newbuildings, which comprise a small minority of the existing fleet.  Therefore, state-
of-the-art knowledge is often wasted, scratching only the surface of the problem and leaving thousands of ships with 
severe vulnerabilities, that is almost certain to lead to further (unacceptably high) loss of life, property and damage to 
the environment.  The time is ripe, however, to review critically maritime safety and lay the foundations for a mod-
ern, sustainable system.  Key to this is adopting a life-cycle approach for effective risk management.  A formal pro-
cess should address risk at the design stage (risk reduction/mitigation), in operation (managing residual risk) and, 
ultimately, in emergencies (crisis management), ensuring in all cases a tolerable level of risk. Traditionally, however, 
safety is addressed as a fundamental design problem focussing on design measures for safety improvement.  Opera-
tional /active measures (in normal operations and during emergencies) to address safety have not been pursued in a 
similar fashion in a way that provides measurable and hence auditable safety improvement.  Considering the above, a 
life-cycle perspective offers a framework for a holistic approach to risk management, focusing on life cycle and en-
compassing all feasible risk control options, accounting for these based on cost-effectiveness.  This assumes that the 
risk reduction potential of all such measures is known and this is where there is a big gap that needs to be overcome 
before such a process can be institutionalised.  Moreover, while it is clear that the overall safety impact of new tech-
nologies and solutions becoming available through applied research and innovation needs to be quantified, it must be 
acknowledged that no agreed methodology exists for this purpose except for the feedback loop described in the IMO 
GBS Guidelines. IMO has identified the Safety-Level Approach under the Goal-Based Standards (GBS-SLA) as the 
future approach to improve maritime safety (aiming for a truly Risk-Based Regulatory Framework).   
 
In this respect and in in order to industrialise the measurement and management of risk over the life-cycle of the 
vessel, it is important that the performance of the applied risk control options is continuously monitored so that in-
herent uncertainties are quantified, a better understanding on the safety level is obtained and the retrieved feedback 
can ensure that the vessel is built to meet her intended purpose. Furthermore, by encompassing the interaction of 
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human, organisational, technological and software aspects, the emphasis is given on realising how the risk control 
options contribute to efficient risk management implementation. Hence, with such an holistic approach, it is assured 
that objective information is collected so that safety is expressed with numbers (i.e. safety index), it is not isolated 
between design and operation and the decisions are based on a transparent as well as traceable base. This change of 
paradigm will be attained only by setting and demonstrating the effect of continuous safety improvement through 
data, which is perceived as the cornerstone of life-cycle risk management. An essential element in institutionalising 
the process is the development and adoption by IMO of a life-cycle risk management regulatory framework to expe-
dite assignment of credit for any measure and means of risk reduction.  Pursuing the realisation of the full potential 
of life-cycle risk management, it is expected that during the process, issues with respect to data collection and meth-
odology, monitoring systems, sensors, models, tools, etc. may be identified, thus requiring resolution through specif-
ically targeted research, as shown in Fig 2. 
 
Fig 2  Illustration of the Chevron approach to LCRM 
 
Underpinned research and development 
 
The goal is to contribute to safer waterborne operations through development and implementation of a Life-Cycle 
Risk Management approach, accounting rationally and formally for all cost-effective active and passive measures of 
risk reduction and leading to cost-effective safety improvements for new and existing ships and offshore units as well 
as to promote safety culture and the regulatory framework. The recently established European research association 
³9HVVHOVIRUWKH)XWXUH´WDUJHWVVDIHUVKLSSLQJDVRQHNH\DUHDIRUIXWXUHUHVHDUFKGHYHORSPHQWDQGLQQRYDWLRQ7KH\
promote a long-term objective to reduce risk of crew onboard ships built in Europe by 90% in 2050 compared to 
2010. Technology focus areas for implementation towards 2025 have been published addressing the above and 
shown here in Fig 3.  
 
 
Fig 3  EU Research Targets for Safer Shipping (VftF Strategic Research Agenda)  
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RISK-BASED DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION AND LCRM 
 
Generalised methodology 
 
This thinking is largely in line with the above-mentioned Safety Case and FSA approaches and more latterly the 
Guidelines on Alternative Design and Arrangements (MSC\Circ.1002, 1212) with the focus clearly on safety perfor-
mance verification. The Safety Case approach to safety management is more ship-specific rather than ship type spe-
cific as in the case of the FSA.  As such, it is treated as a "living instrument", starting with the first concept of design 
and spanning the whole life cycle of the vessel.  It starts with a suite of safety claims.  As the design develops, the 
claims can be reinforced with arguments. When the design is finalized, the arguments can be verified with evidence. 
At the design stage, the evidence consists of results of relevant design safety verification activities (e.g., engineering 
analysis, model tests, etc.). These results are used to assess the risk level and verify that adequate measures are taken 
into account to ensure that residual risks (to be managed operationally) are acceptable. This is illustrated in Fig 4. 
 
 
 
Fig 4  Safety Level Estimation during Concept Design Stage of Passenger Ships 
 
The focus on dealing with residual risks, naturally leads to the need for a SMS (Safety Management System), 
outlining the organization and procedures required to maintain a tolerable level of safety throughout the life of the 
vessel. This has to be aligned with the ISM (International Safety Management) Code implemented onboard. The 
formal process facilitates measurement of safety performance, which contributes to the process of continuous 
improvement. Pertinent activities include aspects of onboard and shore-based Safety Centres, monitoring systems 
and emergency decision-support for crisis management. Ultimately, all these feed into future newbuildings 
specification.  
 
Design phase:  safety level (total risk) estimation 
 
A common way of presenting graphically the chance of a loss (risk) in terms of fatalities is by using the so-called F-
N diagram, the plot of cumulative frequency of N or more fatalities, together with related criteria, Fig 5, (IMO 
MSC85 2009).  In addition, some form of aggregate information is used, such as the expected number of fatalities 
E(N), often referred to as the Potential Loss of Life, PLL.  This is outlined next. 
 
Risk model 
 ܴ݅ݏ݇௉௅௅ ؠ ܧሺܰሻ ؠ  ? ܨேே೘ೌೣ௜ୀଵ ሺ݅ሻ                                                             (1)     
Where Nmax the maximum number of persons onboard and the FN curve is given as: 
 ܨேሺܰሻ ൌ  ? ݂ݎேሺ݅ሻே೘ೌೣ௜ୀே                                                                      (2) 
  
The frequency frN(N) of occurrence of exactly N fatalities per ship year is modelled as follows: 
 ݂ݎேሺܰሻ ൌ  ? ݂ݎ௛௭൫݄ݖ௝൯  ? ݌ݎேሺܰȁ݄ݖ௝ሻ௡೓೥௝ୀଵ                                                     (3) 
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Fig 5  FSA Cruise Ships ± Societal Risk 
 
Where, nhz is the number of loss scenarios considered, and hzj represents a loss scenario, identifiable by any of the 
principal hazards. Furthermore, frhz(hzj) is the frequency of occurrence of scenario hzj per ship year, and prN(N|hzj) is 
the probability of occurrence of exactly N fatalities, given that loss scenario hzj has occurred. Table 1 shows esti-
mates for the annual frequencies of occurrence for flooding- and fire-related hazards derived from statistics, (Ja-
sionowski and Vassalos, 2006).  
 
Table 1  Principal hazards 
j  Principal hazards, jhz  
Average historical frequency of 
occurrence,  
jhz hzfr  
1 Collision and flooding  1.48E-3, (cruise ships) 
2 Fire  0.92E-2, (cruise ships) 
3 Intact Stability Loss  
4 Systems Failure  
 «HWF  
 
Research effort is currently being expended to derive these from first principles. With passenger ships, flooding- and 
fire-related scenarios comprise over 90% of the risk (regarding loss of life) and almost 100% of all the events leading 
to decisions to abandon ship. Therefore, it would be possible to estimate the total risk (safety level) of a passenger 
vessel by addressing these two principal hazards alone in a consistent manner and framework, allowing for their 
contribution to risk to be formally combined as indicated in Fig 4 and in Equation (3).  
 
The specific design implementation highlighted here relates to the largest cruise ship ever built during the concept 
development phase, under the name Project Genesis, having the general particulars depicted in Fig 6 and Table 2 
below.  
 
 
Fig 6  Project Genesis 
Table 2  Project Genesis Main particulars 
Length 361 m 
Breadth 47 m 
Draught 9.15 m 
Gross Tonnage 225,000  
Air Draught 72 - 65 m 
Number of Guests 5,400 
Number of Crew 2,166 
LSA Capacity 8,460 
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As this vessel represents a step change in the size of mega-ships, including some unique, innovative features, focus-
ing on safety and adopting a risk-based design methodology came naturally; in fact the initiative was entirely that of 
the owner.  The task in hand was no less than proving that Genesis is not only the largest ship ever built but also the 
safest and do so during the concept design stage commensurate with all other design goals and functional require-
ments.  The procedure adopted to achieve this is briefly described in the following under four pertinent headings:  
 
Flooding survivability analysis 
 
For undertaking this analysis a complex geometric model was developed comprising 717 compartments and 1,160 
openings, as depicted in Fig 7. 
 
 
Fig 7  Flooding Analysis Model for Project Genesis 
Frequency Analysis (  1hzfr hz :  Even though analysis targeted both collision and grounding related flooding, only 
collision is addressed here to allow comparisons between Project Genesis and the rest of the world cruise fleet.  As 
records of 111 ship years of statistics, obtained from the owner, showed zero occurrences of flooding incidents, the 
frequency of 1.48E-3 per ship year (1 event every 571 ship years), deriving from statistics of the existing cruise 
ships, Table 1, was used instead. 
 
Consequence Analysis  1Npr N hz : The comprehensive risk model described in (Vassalos, 2008) requires two param-
eters to be estimated: the first is the time required for orderly evacuation of passengers and crew in any given event, 
derived from numerical simulations using advanced evacuation simulation software (Vassalos at al., 2003); the sec-
ond is the time to capsize/sink, which is evaluated by sampling the random variables comprising loading conditions, 
sea states and damage characteristics (location, length, height, penetration according to the damage statistics adopted 
in the probabilistic rules) using Monte Carlo sampling and each damage scenario is simulated using explicit dynamic 
flooding simulation by PROTEUS3, (Jasionowski, 2005).  The investigation involves a case by case explicit dynamic 
flooding simulation accounting for transient- cross- and progressive-flooding, impact of multi-free surfaces, water-
tight and semi-watertight doors.  342 collision scenarios were used resulting in an absolute sampling error for the 
cumulative probability of time to capsize of the order of 4%-5%.  A typical set up of Monte Carlo simulations is 
shown in Fig 8 (generic) and Fig 9 for Project Genesis collision studies. A comprehensive experimental programme 
was also set up to verify the numerical simulations, offering corroborative evidence and hence confidence in the 
derived results, which are presented in Fig 10 as an F-N curve together with results from the FSA on cruise ships 
(IMO MSC 85, 2009). 
The results clearly demonstrate the superior flooding survivability characteristics of Project Genesis.   
 
 
Fig 8   Monte Carlo Simulation ± Collision 
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Fig 9  Monte Carlo Simulation Set up ± Collision 
 
Fig 10  Societal Risk ± Collision Accidents  
  
Fire safety analysis 
 
A full description of the risk model developed for fire safety analysis can be found in (Vassalos, 2008).  The general 
set up is illustrated in Fig11 next.  The ship has 144 fire zones, 80 in excess of SOLAS. 
 
Fig 11  Fire Risk Model Illustration 
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Frequency Analysis ݂ݎ௛௭൫݄ݖ௝൯:  A fire incidents database was provided by the owner containing 577 fire incidents 
(including near-misses) in 111 ship years of records. This was used to derive a simple numerical model for fire oc-
currence in any given space onboard the ship based on frequency per unit area for each type of space. 
 
Consequence Analysis ݌ݎேሺܰȁ݄ݖ௝ሻ:  Empirical data was used to develop design fires for each type of space onboard 
and fire dynamics calculations to estimate the time evolution of the fire in both enclosed and external spaces.  Similar 
to flooding cases, escape time simulations were also undertaken to estimate impact on occupants.  A total of 8,326 
fire scenarios were evaluated in 144 fire zones (8 main vertical zones and 18 decks) for night and day occupancy 
cases.  The results are presented in Fig 12 as societal risk, together again with results from the FSA on cruise ships.  
The superior fire safety characteristics of project Genesis are clear to see. 
 
Fig 12  Societal Risk ± Fire and Explosion Accidents   
With flooding and fire modelled consistently using the same framework, the risk contributions from each hazard can 
be combined, thus giving what constitutes (almost) the total risk for Project Genesis, as shown in Fig 13 together 
with the corresponding result from the IMO cruise ship FSA. 
 
In addition to the foregoing considerations a number of specific regulatory and other safety issues were considered as 
outlined briefly in the following. 
 
 
Fig 13  Societal Risk ± Project Genesis Vs Existing Fleet   
 
Alternative Designs (Equivalent Safety) 
x Large fire zones, average 1,950 m2 designed to SOLAS Ch. II-2 Reg. 17 and Guideline MSC/Circ. 1002 
x Openings in main fire bulkheads with A-60 roller shutters (Royal Promenade) 
x Fire breaks on open areas between split superstructure 
x LSA: Enhanced functionality large lifeboats ± Rescue Vessels (18 life boats for 370 persons each); 4 MES Sta-
tions for 450 persons each. 
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Dynamic Behaviour at Sea 
x Extensive model tests with full-scale verification, including: life boat tests; weather criteria tests; wave excita-
tion measurements on rigid and segmented models; parametric rolling; behaviour in F/Q seas; manoeuvring cal-
culations / simulations and model tests. 
Safe Return to Port 
x Systems related to propulsion, covering also steering and manoeuvring capability ( + fire, flooding, navigation) 
x Systems related to comfort 
Additional Safety and Security Features  
x Dedicated Safety Centre within bridge 
x Improved focus on navigation 
x Improved ability to manage safety and security incidents 
x Dynamic Positioning 
x Improved systems for emergency mustering 
x Comprehensive digital CCTV system 
 
Operational phase:  management of residual risk 
 
Having achieved the goal of designing a safe ship cost-effectively and to go beyond all new and emerging safety 
requirements by utilizing all available knowledge and technology, the question that came naturally to the fore is 
whether this extensive knowledge acquired during the design phase could be used to manage operational / accidental 
risk over the life-cycle of the vessel.  More importantly, the goal post could be set even higher, namely to target op-
timum balance between safety and operational efficiency.  Tackling such questions and concerns as watertight doors, 
ballasting/de-ballasting, damage control and so on led to the development of iStand (illustrated in Fig 14), a Decision 
Support System (DSS) installed onboard the first ship of the Genesis series with the following general features ± in 
addition to being a standard onboard loading computer: 
1. Real time sensors and hardwarHLQWHJUDWLRQOLQNWRVKLS¶V606 tank levels, draughts, door states, water ingress 
alarms, wind and waves.  Any change in ship loading or internal architecture is being continuously monitored.  
2. Vulnerability log: Global and local ship vulnerability to flooding - monitoring the flooding-related risk onboard 
to any changes in related ship or environmental parameters. Vulnerability to fire is undergoing development.   
3. Criticality assessment: survival time, escape and evacuation time (crisis management) 
4. Corrective action search: evaluation of the impact of corrective actions. Ballast system availability. 
5. Essential systems availability post-flooding: verification of compliance with Safe Return to Port requirements.  
 
The DSS developed comprises a very powerful computer with a massive database encapsulating all the features of 
Safe Return to Port Requirements and linked to sensors capable of monitoring all the elements that could affect ship 
vulnerability.   
 
 
Fig 14  Screenshot of iStand (Onboard Decision Support System)  
 
Emergency response:  preparedness / crisis management 
 
In support of a life-cycle risk management thrust, the first two elements of the DSS provide for monitoring of ship 
operation and feedback functions whilst 3 to 5 provide internal capability for handling emergencies.  Moreover, the 
on-board experience gained to date provides invaluable information to guide improvements in the design for the next 
generation of cruise ships.  Emergency response is the last line of defence in life-cycle risk management and given 
the potential time constraints in an emergency, emphasis in developing and familiarizing crew with emergency re-
sponse procedures is paramount.  This brings to the fore the need for continuous monitoring, a key element to pre-
paredness.  Equally as important is the ability to provide the master with clear cut advisory related to managing a 
crisis.  All these are elements currently under development by leading cruise ship operators, Fig 15.  
 
 
Fig 15  Screenshot of iStand (Emergency Response - Crisis Management)  
 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY FROM COMMERCIAL TO NAVAL VESSELS 
 
With the obvious exception of weapons, what differentiates a naval from a commercial vessel is: 
x The ability to maintain its fighting and aviation support activities in design defined sea states 
x The ability to retain a high level of operational effectiveness under hostile action ± i.e. its survivability. 
 
Part of the Float-Fight-Move ethos of the navy renders the ability to recover from an incident a priority requirement.  
The scenarios that need to be considered in design are: 
x Above water attack; 
x Internal & external blast; 
x Underwater explosions; 
x Shock; 
x Whipping; 
x Fragmentation; 
x Residual strength. 
 
These were (and remains in part) a fundamental difference between naval and commercial vessels.  However, the 
62/$6UHTXLUHPHQWIRU³6DIH5HWXUQWR3RUW (SRtP)´PD\EHSHUFHLYHGDWOHDVWLQSDUWDVWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIQDYDO
philosRSK\RQFRPPHUFLDOVKLSVQRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKH³SUREDELOLVWLFYHUVLRQ´RI65W3DV it is being now implemented 
for verification purposes in passenger ships. Whilst classification has been a requirement for commercial vessels 
(over a certain size ± i.e. L>24m. or D>500gt), classification of naval vessels is an optional process.  According to 
Lloyds Register (2014), the role of Class in commercial shipping is to demonstrate that materiel safety is in compli-
DQFHZLWKLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQZKHUHDVLWVUROHLQQDYDOYHVVHOVLV³WRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWPDWHULHOVDIHW\KDVEHHQ
benchmarked against international legislation while recognising the operational role of the vessel and also recognis-
LQJWKDWWKHQDY\PD\KDYHDKLJKHUWROHUDQFHRIULVNLQVSHFLILFVLWXDWLRQV´ 
 
The Naval Ship Code (2014) has been at the centre of naval ship design in recent years.  The NSC is a goal-based 
standard that determines a minimum level of safety for naval vessels.  It is published by NATO (ANEP-77; currently 
at issue E, 2014).  It covers areas such as: 
x Structure 
x Buoyancy, Stability & Controllability; 
x Engineering Systems; 
x Fire Safety; 
x Escape, Evacuation & Rescue; 
x etc. 
 
In Chapter 1 Part A Para.4 it states: 
The regulatory function implied in this Code requires as a minimum that the ship offers: 
4.1  An equivalent level of safety to that were it regulated under international conventions or regulations applicable 
to merchant shipping; 
4.2 An additional level of safety for normally occurring hazards that reflect the foreseeable operations on which a 
naval ship is or may be engaged; 
4.3  An appropriate level of safety under extreme threat conditions as determined by the Naval Administration. 
 
By being a goal-based approach it does lend itself to non-prescriptive methods, but on the whole Class Rules and 
Naval Authority Notices are used in its application.  There are references to SOLAS, noting that some SOLAS con-
cepts are not applicable to naval vessels (e.g. bulkhead deck).  Also, naval vessels carry ammunition (& troops), 
replenish at sea, and fight damage (rather than abandon ship; however damage control and emergency response are 
becoming common language and practice in passenger ships, as indicated in the foregoing). It should be noted that 
the safety of a naval vessel and its embarked personnel may (in war) be secondary to the safety of those under her 
protection (c.f. in merchant terms, safety of life at sea and environmental protection are paramount). 
 
Notwistanding the differences, the key development that could provide the right conduit to designing and building 
optimal naval vessel, reflecting the triple-A philosophy, relates to risk-based approaches and goal-based standards as 
they are currently implemented to passenger vessels at large.   More important, considering the current climate of 
declining defence budgets and increasing ship costs, the number of ships in most western navies has experienced a 
significant decline.  The only way to counter a potential decrease in capability is through innovation in the ship de-
sign process.   
 
In this respect, could Risk-Based Design lead to the following? (These are some examples to whet the appetite!)  
1) Optimised subdivision ± how? The MoD Naval Authority (DESNAG-Stab) has issued a NAN with updated 
templates for the various damage scenarios that need to be considered (200+).  How can a risk based approach 
optimise subdivision? 
The application of the probabilistic rules for damage stability require consideration of thousands of damage sce-
narios in order to ensure appropriate subdivision but, more importantly, in order to identify deign vulnerabilities 
to flooding and address these in the concept design phase.  More importantly, as subdivision is a key element in 
the design process, the Subdivision Index, is chosen as one of the KPIs and defined in a knowledge-intensive form 
(response surface) to allow for fast and accurate calculations and trade-offs between subdivision and other de-
sign objectives (weight, strength, powering, systems availability post-casualty, etc.) through overlaps at parame-
ter level.  In this respect, the latter are also addressed through the use of parametric models and access to fast, 
accurate and Knowledge-Intensive Models (KIMs) as well as access to databases (past designs, incident 
/accident data, etc.). As indicated earlier, there is need for integration of all the tools and data under one umbrel-
la (Integrated Design Environment) to facilitate data and process management.   
 
  Optimised structure ± how?  Structural weight accounts for ~40-50% of the total lightship for a naval vessel.  Yet, 
structural arrangements are rarely optimised for weight at the concept design stage, as the emphasis is placed on 
GHILQLQJ WKHKXOOJHQHUDODUUDQJHPHQWDQGSRZHULQJVROXWLRQ WRPHHW WKHFOLHQW¶VRSHUDWLRQDO UHTXLUHPHQWV  In 
commercial ship design, due to the sheer numbers, there is a good database of experience to draw from.  This is 
not the case for naval vessels where the turnover of designs is less frequent, and these days the design solutions 
represent significant extrapolations from historical data, which renders historical (and published) data almost un-
usable. Can RBD assist in achieving optimised solutions in the early design phases? 
Even though structural strength in passenger ships is ensured by focussing on the strength deck (subdivision 
deck), carrying deadweight is an undesirable expense and as such focus on light materials and optimal structural 
arrangements is paramount.  Moreover, comfort and aesthetics in passenger ships requires the use of extensive 
continuous spaces, some positioned on top of the pods/propellers and demanding feathery smoothness and quiet-
ness.  Thus, structural optimisation is a key.  Indeed, structural reliability in commercial shipping (initially off-
shore) has been one of the proponents of risk-based design.  The process is similar to what has been explained 
above, i.e., using structural reliability index in parametric form as one of the KPIs to be considered in the con-
cept design phase.     
 
2) Optimised passive and active firefighting measures ± how? 
Even though probabilistic rules for damage stability have not found their way to SOLAS, approval of Alternatives 
and Equivalents (Chapter II-2, Regulation 17, MSC/ Circ. 1002) provides the motivation and the framework for 
risk-based design.  Similarly, EC projects like SAFEGUARD and FIREPROOF have elaborated the development 
of a probabilistic framework for fire safety in a similar fashion to the probabilistic framework for damage stabil-
ity, leading to a Fire Safety Index (similar to the Subdivision Index) that allows the risk from fire to be considered 
alongside the risk from flooding in the design process, as outlined earlier in the paper.  This way, a Fire Safety 
Index is used as a measure of passive and active fire protection (again in a parametric from), alongside the Sub-
division Index, for optimisation studies during the concept design phase.   
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Based on the review of development and implementation of RBD in commercial shipping, the following concluding 
remarks can be drawn concerning the naval sector: 
x Life-cycle Risk Management is a formal process providing a holistic framework, to embrace all phases of the 
life-cycle of the vessel from design (risk reduction/mitigation) to operation (management of residual risk) and 
emergency response (preparedness/crisis management), leading to safety assurance in the most cost-effective 
way possible.   
x With experience gained in application to commercial shipping, the advantage of being able to address complexi-
ty at the concept design stage, leads to drastic evolutionary developments that nurtures innovation whist facilitat-
ing notable safety improvements cost-effectively. 
x There is enough knowledge accumulated in commercial shipping in the form of tools, data and processes and 
maturity gained though application to knowledge-intensive and safety-critical ships to advocate that Risk-Based 
Design is the only way to realise truly optimal designs, in this particular forum the Triple-A Navy. 
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